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1. Introduction
Choné and Laroque (2005) and Laroque (2005) have shown, in an optimal income tax model
wherein the labor supply response is along the extensive margin, that the Rawlsian criterion
provides a benchmark: the La¤er bound. All optimal allocations correspond to tax schedules
that are below this benchmark. This note gives a comparable result when the labor supply is at
the intensive margin as in the standard optimal income tax problem a la Mirrlees (1971). Here
too the maximin solution provides a benchmark. Assuming that preferences are quasilinear in
consumption with an isoelastic disutility for labor, maximin criterion gives an upper bound for
the optimal marginal income tax schedule. All such schedules derived under a welfarist criterion
aggregating a concave transformation of individual utilities over the entire population must lie
below this benchmark. With a general separable utility function, this result remains valid close to
the bottom and the top of the skill distribution.
2. The Model
We use the model that has been employed in much of the literature on optimal labor income
taxation since the seminal article of Mirrlees (1971). We assume that all individuals have the
same utility function and the latter takes an additively separable form as in Mirrlees (1971) and
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980):
U(x; `) = v(x)  h(`)
where x is consumption and ` is labor (so 1   ` is leisure), with v0 > 0  v00, h0 > 0 and h00  0,
with either v00 < 0 or h00 > 0.
Agents di¤er only in skills, which correspond with their wage rates given that aggregate produc-
tion is linear in labor. Skills w are distributed according to the function F (w) for w 2W = [w;w],
where 0 < w < w < 1. The density function, f(w) = F 0(w), is assumed to be di¤erentiable and
strictly positive for all w 2 W . Individuals obtain their income from wages, with labor income
denoted by y  w`. Therefore, we can use ` = y=w to rewrite the utility function as
v(x)  h(y=w) (1)
The government can observe incomes but not skills or labor supplied, so it bases its tax scheme
T (:) on income y. T (:) is assumed di¤erentiable in y. The budget constraint for individual w is:
x(w) = y(w)  T (y(w)) (2)
1
where T (y (w)) is the tax imposed on type-w individuals. Each agent therefore chooses her income
by solving:
max
y
v(y(w)  T (y(w)))  h(y=w)
Let u(w) be the value of this program. The rst-order condition associated to this program implies
h0(y(w)=w)
wv0(x(w))
= 1  T 0(y(w)) (3)
where the left-hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between income and consumption.
For later use, consumption x (w) can be treated as an implicit function of u (w) and y (w) and
denoted by X (u (w) ; y (w)), where by di¤erentiating (1), we obtain:
@X(u(w); y(w))
@y
=
h0(y (w) =w)
wv0(x (w))
;
@X(u(w); y(w))
@u
=
1
v0(x (w))
(4)
We will compare the optimal tax schedules derived under a maximin criterion and a welfarist
criterion that sums over all individuals a transformation  of individualsutility with 0 > 0 and
00  0 (hence the government has a non-negative aversion to inequality) and  independent of
w. Under maximin, the government maximizes the welfare of the least well-o¤ households. Given
our information assumptions, the worst-o¤ will be those with skill w at the bottom of the skill
distribution hence the maximin criterion is
u(w) (5)
The welfarist social preferences are Z w
w
(u(w))f (w) dw (6)
The government chooses the tax schedule T (:) or, equivalently, the consumption-utility bundle
intended for each household fx(w); u(w); w 2Wg, to maximize its social welfare function, subject
to two sorts of constraints.
The rst is the government budget constraint, which takes the form:Z w
w
[y(w) X(u(w); y(w))]f(w)dw  R (7)
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement. This constraint must be binding at the optimum
since utility is increasing in consumption.
The second is the set of incentive-compatibility constraints, that require that type-w agents
choose the consumption-income bundle intended for them, that is,
u (w)  v (x (w))  h

y(w)
w

 v (x ( bw))  hy( bw)
w

8 (w; bw) 2W 2 (8)
2
We assume that w 7! y(w) is continuous on [w;w] and di¤erentiable everywhere, except for a nite
number of skill levels and that w 7! u(w) is di¤erentiable. Hence, w 7! x(w) is also continuous
everywhere and di¤erentiable almost everywhere. These assumptions are made for reasons of
tractability and have been standard since Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984).
Our individual preferences ensure that the strict-single crossing (Spence-Mirrlees) condition
holds. Hence, constraints (8) are equivalent to imposing the following di¤erential equation (see
Mirrlees 1971) that is called rst-order incentive compatibility conditions (FOIC):
:
u(w)
a.e.
= h0(:)
y(w)
w2
> 0 8w (9)
and the monotonicity requirement that the earnings level y(w) be a nondecreasing function of the
skill level w.1
The problem for the government is to choose y (w) and u (w) to maximize its welfare function
subject to the budget constraint (7) and the FOIC conditions (9):
Max
fu(w);y(w)g
W (u(:)) s.t.
Z w
w
[y(w) X(u(w); y(w))]f(w)dw = R, :u(w) = h0

y(w)
w

y(w)
w2
(10)
where the social welfare function W (u(:)) represents either (5)2 or (6).
The corresponding Lagrangian is:
$ W (u(:)) + 
Z w
w

[y(w) X(u(w); y(w))]f(w)  R
w   w

dw
+
Z w
w
(w)

h0

y(w)
w

y(w)
w2
  :u(w)

dw (11)
where  is the multiplier associated with the binding budget constraint (7) and (w) is the multiplier
associated with the FOIC conditions (9). The necessary conditions are given in the Appendix.
Under maximin, the rst-order conditions reduce to the following:
T 0M (y(w))
1  T 0M (y(w))
= A(w)
1
wf(w)
v0(xM (w))
Z w
w
f (t)
v0 (xM (t))
dt 8w 2W (12)
1 In the core of the paper, for simplicity, we follow the (usual) rst-order approach and ignore the monotonicity
requirement
:
y(w)  0 (or equivalently :x(w)  0) (Ebert 1992). If the second-order incentive compatibility (SOIC)
constraints are slack (
:
y(w) > 0), the rst-order approach is appropriate. Where they are binding, we have
:
x(w) =
:
y(w) = 0, so there is bunching of agents of di¤erent skills. The appendix gives the necessary conditions for the
governments problem when bunching occurs.
2The maximin solution can also be obtained from an equivalent revenue-maximizing problem as follows. Take
u as given and consider the tax proles that will generate it, given the incentive conditions. Clearly, u can be
supported by a large number of tax proles such that tax revenues are no greater than R, that is,Z w
w
[y(w) X(u(w); y(w))]f(w)dw  R
As long as the incentive constraints are satised for all w, we know from the above problem that achieving u(w) = u
requires that the tax revenue generated cannot exceed R, so the above inequality must be satised. In fact, if we
maximize the amount of tax revenue that will yield utility u for the worst-o¤ agents, that level of revenue will be
precisely R. Therefore, maximizing tax revenue subject to u (w) > u and the incentive conditions is equivalent
maximizing u (w) subject to the revenue and incentive constraints.
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where the subscript M states for maximin and where
A(w) = 1 +
h00(y(w)=w)y(w)
h0(y(w)=w)w
is a measure of the elasticity of labor supply.3
Under the social welfare function (6), the marginal tax rate denoted by T 0(y(w)) can be ex-
pressed as:4
T 0(y(w))
1  T 0(y(w))
= A(w)
1
wf(w)
v0(x(w))
Z w
w

1
v0 (x (t))
  
0 (u(t))


f(t)dt 8w 2W (13)
where the subscript  states for the social objective
R w
w
(u(w))f (w) dw.
Assume, following Diamond (1998), that h(`) takes the isoelastic form so A(w) is constant.
In order to show that the marginal tax rate under maximin is always above or equal to the one
under the more general social welfare function, we have to show that T 0M (y(w))= (1  T 0M (y(w))) 
T 0(y(w))= (1  T 0(y(w)))  0 8w since it is well established that 0  T 0(y(w)) < 1 (Seade 1977,
1982). Since A(w) and wf(w) do not depend on the objective function, this reduces to show that

(w)  v0(xM (w))
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt  v0(x(w))
Z w
w

1
v0(x(t))
  
0 (u(t))


f(t)dt  0 8w
(14)
First, consider 
(w) at w = w. From (22) (in the Appendix) and the transversality condition
(w) = 0, we have:

(w) = v0(xM (w))
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt > 0 (15)
Second, putting w = w in (14) gives:

(w) = 0 (16)
Equation (15) relies on the sharp contrast between the optimal marginal tax rate at the bottom
under maximin and under a more general social welfare function. Assuming no bunching at the
bottom, T 0(y(w)) = 0 under the more general welfarist criterion (Seade 1977). Contrastingly,
T 0M (y(w)) > 0 under maximin. Intuitively, increasing the marginal tax rate at a skill level ew distorts
the labor supply of those with skill ew, implying an e¢ ciency loss. However, it also improves equity
when the extra tax revenue can be redistributed towards a positive mass of agents with skills
w  ew. As long as the latter outweighs the former in the welfare criterion, such transfers are
3The term A (w) that can be rewritten as [1 + `h00(`)=h0(`)] is equal to [1 + eu(wn)]=ec(wn) where ec(wn) and
eu(wn) are the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of labor supply, respectively. More precisely, using (3),
ec(wn) and eu(wn) satisfy
ec(wn) =
h0(`)
(h00(`)  w2nv00(x)) `
> 0 and eu(wn) =
h0(`) + v00(x)w2n`
(h00(`)  w2nv00(x))`
where wn  w(1  T 0(y(w))) is the after-tax wage rate (Saez 2001).
4This writing is similar to the optimal tax formula in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
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positively valued, hence an equity gain appears. Under social preferences
R w
w
(u(w))f (w) dw, the
mass of people at the bottom of the skill distribution is zero hence a positive marginal tax rate
would not improve equity but would create an e¢ ciency loss. Even when the aversion to inequality
approaches innity in the social welfare function, the marginal tax rate continues to be zero at the
bottom (Boadway and Jacquet 2008).5 Contrastingly, under maximin, everyone in the objective
function is at w = w, so the equity e¤ect is positive hence T 0M (y(w)) > 0. Moreover, as well
known since Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977), the optimal marginal tax rate at the top is zero with
a bounded skill distribution, i.e. T 0M (y(w)) = T
0
(y(w)) = 0, which yields (16). These results can
be summarized as follows.
Lemma 1 At the bottom (top) of the skill distribution, the optimal marginal tax rate under max-
imin is larger (equal) to the one under criterion
R w
w
(u(w))f (w) dw.
From (15) and (16), deriving conditions under which 
(w) is monotonically decreasing in w on
(w;w) implies (14). In other words, 
(w) monotonically decreasing in w on (w;w) ensures that
the optimal marginal tax rates under maximin are larger than the ones under the general social
welfare function. We di¤erentiate (14):

0(w) = v00(xM (w))
:
xM (w)
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt (17)
 v00(x(w)) :x(w)
Z w
w

1
v0(x(t))
  
0 (u(t))


f(t)dt  v0(x(w))
0 (u(w))

f(w)
Proposition 1 With quasilinear-in-consumption preferences and when h(`) takes the isoelastic
form, the marginal tax rate T 0M (y(w)) derived under maximin is always larger than that under the
general social welfare function
R w
w
(u(w))f (w) dw, 8w 2 (w;w).
Proof. Substituting v0(x) = 1 and v00(x) = 0 into (17), we obtain:

0(w) =  
0 (u(w))

f(w) < 0
This completes the proof that 
(w) is monotonically decreasing in w under quasilinear-in-consumption
preferences.
Proposition 2 With separable utility, close to the bottom and the top of the skill distribution,
the marginal tax rate T 0M (y(w)) derived under maximin is always larger than that under criterionR w
w
(u(w))f (w) dw.
5 It is worth noting that a discrete support for the skill distribution, hence social preferences written asPw
w (u(w))dw, is a su¢ cient condition for having a strictly positive marginal tax rate at the bottom. Intu-
itively, the mass of people at the bottom of the skill distribution is then strictly positive hence a positive marginal
tax rate at w = w improves equity.
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Proof. Evaluating (17) at w = w, using (20), (22), (25) and (27) (in the Appendix) yields:

0(w) =
v00(xM (w))
:
xM (w)
M
  v0(x(w))
0 (u(w))

f(w) < 0
From (17), when w = w, we have:

0(w) =
 v0(x(w))(u(w))f(w)

< 0
Therefore, since Equation (16) states that 
(w) = 0 and Equation (15) states 
(w) > 0 we can
conclude that 
(w) is monotonically decreasing in w close to w and w, with general additively
separable preferences.
The work undertaken in this note identies the following extension: What happens when the
utility is not linear in consumption or not isoelastic in hours of work? It would be interesting to
derive conditions under which, at least over some range of the skill distribution, our upper bound
result does not hold, i.e. under which the second term (which is positive) in (14) o¤sets the other
two terms (which are negative). This is left for future research.
3. Conclusion
The purpose of this note has been to provide conditions under which maximin entails higher
optimal marginal tax rates than other social preferences, at any skill level. Assuming quasilinear-
in-consumption preferences and an isoelastic disutility of labor, the optimal marginal tax rates
under maximin give an upper bound to the ones we would obtain under welfarist criteria that
integrate over the population any concave transformation of individual utilities. With additive
preferences, this dominance result is also valid close to the bounds of the skill distribution.
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Appendix: First-order conditions
This appendix gives the necessary conditions of (10) under the welfarist objective function (6) and
the ones under maximin (5).
Integrating by parts to obtain
R w
w
(w)
:
u(w)dw = (w)u(w)  (w)u(w)  R w
w
:
(w)u(w)dw, the
Lagrangian (11) becomes
$ W (u(:)) + 
Z w
w

[y(w) X(u(w); y(w))]f(w)  R
w   w

dw
+ (w)u(w)  (w)u(w) +
Z w
w

(w)h0

y (w)
w

y(w)
w2
+
:
(w)u(w)

dw
The rest of this section simplies the mathematical writing by using the same notation for
variables at the optimum under both objective functions. However, in the equations we need
for a later demonstration, we add subscripts  or M for social preferences (6) and for maximin,
respectively. Under (6), the necessary conditions (assuming an interior solution) are:6
@$
@y(w)
= 

1  h
0(:)
wv0(:)

f(w) +
(w)h0(:)
w2

1 +
y(w)h00(:)
wh0(:)

= 0 8w 2W (18)
@$
@u(w)
= 0 (u(w)) f(w)  f(w)
v0(:)
+
:
(w) = 0 8w 2 (w;w) (19)
@$
@u(w)
= (w) = 0 (20)
@$
@u(w)
=  (w) = 0 (21)
Integrating
:
(w) in (19) and using the transversality condition (w) = 0, we obtain:
 (w)

=
Z w
w

1
v0(x(t))
  
0 (u(t))


f(t)dt (22)
6When we di¤erentiate the Lagrangian, we must do so with respect to the end-points as well as the interior
points, which gives the transversality conditions. These necessary conditions can also be derived based on variational
techniques using Pontryagins principle (Pontryagin 1964).
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Using (3), (18) may be rewritten as:
T 0(y(w))
1  T 0(y(w))
=  (w)v
0 (x(w))
wf(w)

1 +
y(w)h00(y(w)=w)
wh0(y(w)=w)

8w 2W (23)
Finally, combining (22) and (23), the rst-order conditions characterizing the optimal marginal
tax rates under (6) can be written as (13).
Under maximin, we have the necessary condition (18) and also:
@$
@u(w)
=  f(w)
v0(:)
+
:
M (w) = 0 8w 2 (w;w) (24)
@$
@u(w)
= 1 + M (w) = 0 (25)
@$
@u(w)
=  M (w) = 0 (26)
Integrating
:
(w) in (24) and using the transversality condition M (w) = 0, we obtain:
 M (w)

=
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt (27)
Using (3), (18) may be rewritten as:
T 0M (y(w))
1  T 0M (y(w))
=  M (w)v
0 (x(w))
wf(w)

1 +
y(w)h00(y(w)=w)
wh0(y(w)=w)

8w 2W (28)
Finally, combining (27) and (28), the rst-order conditions characterizing the optimal marginal
tax rates can be written as (12).
When the monotonicity constraint
:
y(w)  0 binds over [w0; w1], there is bunching over this
interval. Equation (18) is then modied as follows (see, for instance, Guesneries and La¤ont 1984):Z w1
w0



1  h
0(:)
wv0(:)

f(w) +
(w)h0(:)
w2

1 +
y(w)h00(:)
wh0(:)

dw = 0
whereas Equation (19) (derived under (6)) and Equation (24) (derived under maximin) still hold.
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